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Abstract 
Excessive fiscal spending is commonly cited as a primary cause of the current European 
sovereign debt crisis. We develop an alternative hypothesis which better accounts for 
systemic differences towards EMU countries’ exposure to market speculation: the rise of 
competitiveness imbalances which contributed to national imbalances in total borrowing. We 
outline that one driver of competitiveness divergence is a country’s capacity to limit sheltered 
sector wage growth, relative to wage growth in the manufacturing sector. We posit that 
corporatist institutions which linked sectoral wage developments together in the surplus 
countries provided them with a comparative wage advantage vis-à-vis EMU’s debtor nations, 
explaining why the EMU core has emerged relatively unscathed from market speculation 
during the crisis despite that fact that some of these countries had poor fiscal performances 
during EMU’s early years. Using a panel regression analysis, we demonstrate that rising 
differentials between public and manufacturing sector wage growth, as well as wage 
governance institutions which weakly coordinate exposed and sheltered sectors, are 
significantly correlated with export decline.  We also find that weak governance institutions 
are significantly associated with more prominent export decline inside a monetary union, 
compared to outside of monetary union. 
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Comparative Institutional Advantage in the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
Introduction 
What systemic factors explain why some sovereigns in Europe’s Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) have fallen victim to heavy market speculation 
amidst the current economic crisis, while others have remained unscathed? 
Governments’ reckless fiscal spending prior to the financial crisis has 
emerged as the primary scapegoat of the current debt tragedy within E(M)U’s 
peripheral economies. Primary policy prescriptions of the ‘troika’ (the 
European Commission, European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund) have made national bail-outs conditional on deep public 
spending cuts. Recent events between Greece and the troika exhibit the 
typical austerity-politic deadlock between the EMU’s debtors and those which 
have agreed to provide them necessary funds. The political risk of failing to 
implement the Commission’s demands and hence failing to receive successive 
tranches of funds is all too apparent for the southern economy, despite a 
contraction in real GDP per capita of nearly 20% since 2007, an 
unemployment rate of 21% in the first quarter of 20121, and the rise of fascist 
sympathies as voters flock to the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn. Such 
austerity conditionality has also been applied to Ireland, Portugal and 
recently Spain and Cyprus, while other European governments who have not 
yet knocked on the European Financial Stability Facility’s door have become 
pre-emptive in austerity. 
                                                        
1 OECD (2012) ‘OECD unemployment rate remains stable at 7.9% in May 2012’. 10 July 2012.   
http://www.oecd.org/berlin/HUR_NR07e12.pdf 
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While many acknowledge the role of the 2008 financial crisis as the catalyst 
which initiated Europe’s debt crisis, recent debate has questioned whether 
(systemic) roots of the crisis were established before this pivotal event. 
Amongst Europe’s political leaders and policy makers, the fiscal recklessness 
hypothesis (that the fiscal crises within the EMU periphery were driven by 
unsustainable public borrowing prior to the financial crisis) has almost 
become conventional wisdom. We find this development not only puzzling 
but misleading. Though this hypothesis explains why financial markets doubt 
Greece and Italy's, capacity to repay its debts, it fails to carry to other EMU 
cases. Spain and Ireland, with a better fiscal position than Germany for most 
of the EMU period before the crisis, were subject to more severe market 
speculation. Belgium, in contrast, with persistent high debt levels, has barely 
seen a shift in its bond yields over the past three years. Indeed, once Greece is 
removed from the EMU landscape, fiscal performance, measured either in 
terms of average net government borrowing or public debt between EMU 
entry and the start of the crisis, becomes a poor predictor of the variation in 
current nominal interest rates on long-term government bonds, a common 
indicator used to gauge a country’s default risk. Rather, indicators which are 
tied to competitiveness – real exchange rate developments, export share 
growth, and the average current account balance between EMU entry and the 
start of the crisis – fare better in explaining current diversity in bond yields 
across EMU. 
In this paper, we provide an institutional hypothesis to explain variation in 
EMU member-state exposure to the current crisis. Extending Wihlborg, 
Willett, and Zhang’s (2010) insights on divergences in internal adjustment 
mechanisms as a source of variation in crisis exposure, we posit that countries 
with corporatist institutions that tie wage growth in sheltered sectors to 
sectors exposed to trade have encountered little speculative pressure from 
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markets, despite their pre-2008 fiscal condition, as these institutions helped 
them maintain competitiveness, producing positive trade balances and hence 
reducing the need for significant international borrowing. Countries without 
functional corporatist institutions which tie wage-setters in sheltered sectors 
to those in exposed sectors, on the other hand, lost competitiveness vis-à-vis 
their corporatist neighbors, incurred trade deficits and hence had to rely more 
heavily on international borrowing. In failing to integrate sectoral and 
national labor markets alongside monetary policy, the EMU project has 
created an asymmetric union not only between monetary and fiscal 
integration, but also between monetary and labor market adjustment. The 
lack of labor market integration across EMU member-states has forced 
countries to rely upon national corporatist institutions in order to adjust. In 
other words, corporatism is a crucial institutional advantage which 
differentiates EMU’s creditors from its debtors. 
The next section reviews the (young) debate on the origins of the European 
debt crisis. After outlining the arguments of the two major camps – those 
which attribute variation in speculative exposure to fiscal divergence and 
those which attribute it to competitive divergence – we provide rudimentary 
bivariate analyses which test the robustness of both hypotheses. These 
preliminary analyses largely support the competitiveness hypothesis. We 
depart from the competitiveness hypothesis, however, by offering an 
institutional account of how differences in labour market organization and 
governance within EMU’s member-states may explain divergences in national 
inflation and therefore the real exchange rate in the early years of EMU. We 
then test our hypothesis via a fixed effects panel regression analysis, 
examining the influence of exposed and sheltered wage differentials, as well 
as a sectoral wage-governance dummy, on export share growth in 17 OECD 
economies. We find that countries with high inter-sectoral governance, 
Comparative Institutional Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
  8 
minimizing gaps between sheltered sector and manufacturing sector wage 
growth, also witnessed more prominent growth within their export shares, 
and that such growth was particularly magnified under EMU. The paper 
concludes with a discussion on corporatism and Optimal Currency Area 
(OCA) theory, highlighting the irony that the more ‘rigid’, centralized, and 
highly coordinated wage bargaining regimes within EMU have best 
weathered adjustment in a monetary union.  
 
Making sense of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis 
Within the (young) debate about the origins of the European debt crisis, two 
camps have arisen which seek to explain speculative divergence across 
E(M)U’s sovereigns. The fiscal camp (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; Pisani-Ferry, 
2012; Lane, 2012) has identified the Euro crisis as a consequence of fiscal 
excesses prior to the 2008 financial crisis as well as poor design of EMU which 
led to the availability of cheap credit and lax monitoring on borrowing. Buiter 
and Rahbari (2010) are perhaps the most critical of pre-crisis fiscal accounts, 
arguing that excessive fiscal spending and pro-cyclical behaviour by national 
authorities prior to 2008 further exacerbated deficit problems within EMU’s 
Southern rim after serious financial bail-outs.  
Others have attributed the current fiscal crisis not to the reckless behaviour of 
governments, but to the low real (and nominal) interest rates in EMU’s early 
years, which provided sovereigns, particularly in EMU’s peripheral 
economies that did not have access to such low rates in the early and mid-
1990s, with cheap credit (Lane, 2012). Membership in the Euro-zone provided 
low exchange rate and interest rate premia. Excessive government borrowing 
would be addressed in EMU’s institutional design through the Stability and 
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Growth Pact (SGP) and a ‘no bailout’ clause. However, some doubted 
whether the SGP possessed the credible threat against over-borrowing of its 
predecessor since, in contrast to the Maastricht criteria, failure to comply with 
the SGP would not result in EMU exclusion (Buti and Giudice, 2002; Johnston, 
2012). Moreover, as Baskaran and Hessami (2012) and Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2010) argue, relaxation of the SGP’s fiscal rules by France and 
Germany led to soft budget constraints after 2004, and further enabled the 
high deficit nations to succumb to ‘binge’ borrowing, as markets discounted 
for the best case scenario for convergence even when some nations were 
showing signs of fiscal deterioration. 
While the fiscal camp clearly outlines why EMU’s poor design may have 
contributed to overborrowing in countries for whom market premiums for 
government debt would otherwise be much higher, the competitiveness camp 
doubts that overborrowing problems rested solely in the public sector. Indeed 
several among the latter question whether some governments that are current 
targets of heavy market speculation, such as Spain and Ireland, could be 
defined as ‘fiscally reckless’ given their consistent budget surpluses prior to 
the crash. Examining imbalances between the current accounts of EMU 
member-states, this camp suggests that the problem can be attributed to 
divergences in competitiveness and total borrowing (including most 
importantly private borrowing) (Wihlborg et al., 2010; Belke and Dreger, 2011; 
Bibow, 2012; Gros, 2012). 
The basic argument can be summarized as follows. Because of the absence of 
a nominal exchange rate between Euro-zone member-states, competitiveness 
becomes a function of the real exchange rate, determined by relative inflation 
rates: countries with lower inflation rates hold a more advantagous real 
exchange rate than those with higher inflation rates. Under a fixed monetary 
system, where the majority of trade is intra-regional, wage moderation 
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pursued by one group of countries (the North), serves as a ‘begger-thy-
neighbour’ policy vis-à-vis those (the South) that have not pursued such wage 
moderation (Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo, 2012; Bibow, 2012). Current 
account balances, however, are zero-sum games under a beggar-thy-neighbor 
approach; in order for surplus nations to hold a trade surplus vis-à-vis deficit 
nations2, the former must lend money to the latter via the capital account. 
Assuming a balance of payments equilibrium (and a negible balance item), 
nations with trade deficits must finance these deficits via borrowing from 
surplus countries, hence realizing a positive capital account balance. 
Consequently, under EMU, savings in the countries with a trade surplus were 
invested in capital and consumption projects (most notably in real-estate, 
which further fueled housing bubbles in Spain and Ireland) in countries with 
trade deficits, leading to consumption gluts in the latter (Gros, 2012; Giavazzi 
and Spaventa, 2010; Holinski et al, 2012). Gros (2012) outlines that banking 
systems and other intermediaries within Europe possessed a heavy home 
bias, and hence the excess savings in the north was predominantly invested in 
the Euro-zone itself. While peripheral countries witnessed a consumption 
(and real-estate) boom, their competitiveness further deteriorated vis-à-vis the 
core where wage moderation was strictly enforced. Since currency 
devaluations are impossible in a monetary union, the burden of balance of 
payments adjustment falls predominantely on labour costs (Holinski et al, 
2012; Stockhammer, 2011; Bibow, 2012; Gros, 2012). In other words, the 
south’s failure to adjust its labor costs, and hence its public and private 
borrowing imbalances, vis-à-vis the North preceeding the crisis, prompted 
markets to attach a higher interest rate premium to sovereign bonds in the 
periphery once the crisis was in full swing.  
                                                        
2 Trade with EMU’s Northern economies was quite substantial for the South, although less so for 
Ireland, in the 2000s. In 2005, imports from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands accounted for 40% of Italy’s and Spain’s total imports, 30% of Greece’s and 
Portugal’s imports, and 20% of Ireland’s imports (IMF DOTS, 2008).   
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In order to examine whether the fiscal recklessness or the competitive 
hypothesis holds water, we turn to a basic bivariate analysis which compares 
variation in EMU member-state exposure to the current crisis. We rely upon 
simple bivariate analysis for a preliminary comparison of the fiscal and 
competitiveness hypothesis, rather than a more comprehensive panel 
analysis, because government bond yields in EMU member-states failed to 
diverge until 2010. Between 2000 and 2008, the average maximum spread in 
nominal interest rates on long-term government debt was 0.8% for the 
EMU12, growing to 2% in 2009, 6.3% in 2010 and 13.1% in 2011 (EU AMECO 
Database, 2013). The lack of divergence before 2009 presents a small-n 
problem for panel analysis; at most, we would have three years where bond 
yields in monetary union exhibited suitable variation to test either hypothesis. 
Bivariate analysis, though imperfect given the absence of controls, presents a 
liberal estimate to assess the fiscal and competitive hypothesis; if either 
exhibits weak correlates, it is unlikely that they would become stronger with 
the inclusion of more variables. We select 2011 long term nominal interest 
rates as our (dependent) indicator to proxy market confidence in an EMU 
member-state’s capacity to repay its existing government debt (greater default 
risk carries a higher interest rate premium). For proxies of fiscal performance, 
we apply two indicators; average net government borrowing and average 
government debt, both as percentages of GDP, between EMU entry (1999 for 
all countries except Greece, whose entry year was 2001) and 2007, the year 
before the crisis. 2007 provides a convenient cut-off point in avoiding 
endogeneity problems, as spreads in long term nominal interest rates between 
EMU member-states were highly contained, ranging from 4.2% in Germany to 
4.5% in Greece. Figures 1a and 1b present basic scatter plots between Euro 
member-states’ 2011 long-term government bond yield and their pre-crisis 
average deficit and debt levels, respectively. Best fit line estimates (including 
and excluding Greece) and R-squared values are included below. 
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Figure 1a: 2011 interest rates and pre-crisis deficit performance 
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Best fit line (including Greece): y = -0.81x + 4.94 (R2=0.257) 
Best fit line (excluding Greece): y = -0.14x + 4.90 (R2 = 0.012) 
 
Figure 1b: 2011 interest rates and pre-crisis debt performance 
 
Best fit line (including Greece): y = 0.04x + 3.23 (R2=0.063) 
Best fit line (excluding Greece): y = -0.03x + 6.67 (R2 = 0.050) 
 
Several interesting characteristics about the fiscal performances in EMU prior 
to the crisis are worth noting. Firstly, none of the slope estimates on deficit or 
debt performance (including or excluding Greece) are significant at a 90% 
confidence level. While the average fiscal deficit prior to the crisis on its own 
explains roughly 25.7% of the variation among EMU member-states’ 2011 
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interest rate, this figure is highly dependent upon the inclusion of Greece. If 
Greece is excluded, prior fiscal performance only explains 1.2% of the 
variation in 2011 bond yields. An even starker contrast emerges when 
examining the influence of average pre-crisis debt levels on 2011 bond yields. 
When Greece is included, prior debt performance has a positive association 
with 2011 bond yields and explains 6.3% of its variation. When it is excluded, 
however, prior debt performance has a negative association with 2011 bond 
yields –largely the result of Ireland’s and Portugal’s relatively low pre-crisis 
debt levels.  
Though Figures 1a and 1b exclude other controls that influence government 
bond yields, one fact is evident; fiscal performance prior to the crisis does not 
appear to be a robust systematic explanation for the sovereign debt crisis. 
While this explanation may work well when examining Greece and Italy, it 
does not appear to travel very far. Spain and Ireland, both of which had lower 
debt levels than Germany prior to 2007 and ran consistent surpluses prior to 
2007, have become targets for speculators who are uncertain about their 
capacity to avoid debt restructuring. More surprisingly, Belgium has largely 
been spared from a significant interest premium despite holding a pre-crisis 
debt level of nearly 100% of GDP.  
Turning to the competitiveness hypotheses, we select three measures to gauge 
whether variation in pre-crisis competitive performance is associated with 
variation in 2011 bond exposure to market speculation: growth in export 
shares between EMU entry and 2007, real-exchange rate 
appreciations/depreciations between EMU entry and 2007, and average 
current account balances (as a percentage of GDP) between EMU entry and 
2007. Figures 2a, 2b and 2c present similar bivariate analyses which examine 
the relationship between these two indicators and 2011 long term government 
Comparative Institutional Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
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bond yields. The increase in explanatory power of these indicators, even 
when excluding Greece, is striking. 
Figure 2a: 2011 interest rate and pre-crisis export growth 
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Best fit line (including Greece): y = -0.10x + 7.71 (R2=0.217) 
Best fit line (excluding Greece): y = -0.07x + 6.25 (R2 = 0.230) 
 
Figure 2b: 2011 interest rates and pre-crisis real exchange rate performance 
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Best fit line (including Greece): y = 0.22x + 3.99 (R2=0.355) 
Best fit line (excluding Greece): y = 0.17x + 3.61 (R2 = 0.498) 
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Figure 2c: 2011 interest rates and pre-crisis current account performance 
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Best fit line (including Greece): y = -0.66x + 5.59 (R2=0.670) 
Best fit line (excluding Greece): y = -0.46x + 5.09 (R2 = 0.628) 
 
Whilst we urge caution in drawing definitive statements about the 
relationships between the indicators above given the absence of controls, the 
three competitiveness indicators appear to offer a much better explanation for 
the variation in 2011 interest premiums within EMU member-states compared 
to the fiscal indicators. Slope coefficients are significant at a 90% confidence 
level or higher, regardless of whether Greece is included. Moreover, the 
exclusion of Greece does not significantly alter the best fit estimates or their R-
squared values. Export growth between time of EMU entry and 2007, on its 
own, explains over 20% of the variation in 2011 interest premiums, again 
regardless of whether Greece is included. Changes in the real (effective) 
exchange rate between time of entry and 2007, on their own, account for 
35.5% of variation in the data (49.8% when Greece is excluded), while current 
account balances alone account for over two-thirds of the variation in 2011 
interest rates. Rather than merely explaining Greece and Italy, the competitive 
argument also helps generalize the experiences of Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal, which witnessed stagnant export growth, a significant real exchange 
rate appreciation, larger current account deficits and higher interest premium 
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in 2011, as well as that of Germany and Belgium, which witnessed real 
exchange rate deprecation/stagnation and current account surpluses, much 
despite their high debt balances. 
The competitiveness argument raises an important argument in the debate on 
the origins of the European debt crisis. It fails, however, to provide specific 
explanations as to what fostered internal adjustment mechanisms within the 
EMU core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
which were largely absent within the EMU periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) – even though many within this camp acknowledge that 
adjustment lies predominantly within the realm of labor-markets 
(Stockhammer, 2011; Holinski et al., 2012; Belke and Dreger, 2011). This lack 
of attention to the institutional determinants of divergence in competitiveness 
across the Euro-Area is puzzling: there are plenty of arguments and data that 
emphasize the positive influence of corporatist institutions on comparative 
advantage via wage restraint.   
We explore whether corporatist institutions facilitated export performance in 
the North, and whether these institutions intensified any competitive 
advantages under monetary union. Our argument rests on the analysis of 
how wage dynamics between sectors, specifically those exposed to and those 
sheltered from trade, influence national inflation and hence competitive 
developments. The EMU core possessed corporatist collective bargaining 
institutions, which tied wage developments in sheltered sectors to those in the 
exposed, thus limiting the inflationary potential of the sheltered sector and 
enhancing national competitiveness. The EMU periphery, on the other hand, 
lacked these institutional links between the sheltered and exposed sector – 
consequently wage-setters in the former, not subject to a competitive 
constraint like those in the latter nor to an institutional constraint as their 
sheltered sector counter-parts in the EMU core, were able to push for 
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inflationary wage increases which produced adverse consequences for 
national inflation and hence relative price competitiveness in EMU.  
 
A Corporatist Comparative Advantage: Explaining the 
Core’s Success and the Periphery’s failure 
We begin our analysis with several assumptions. First, we assume two sectors 
in each of the countries: an exposed sector, whose wage setters are under 
competitive pressure to constrain wage growth given high exposure to trade, 
and a sheltered sector (which includes the public sector) whose wage setters 
face a lax competitiveness constraint on wage developments, given the 
relative absence of multiple competitors. While these two sectors may not 
embody the entirety of a country’s labour force, we assume their combined 
weight in the economy, both in terms of employment and in terms of output, 
is significant enough that wage developments would influence national 
inflation either directly via the influence of wages on price mark-up strategies, 
or indirectly via the influence of wages on prices via demand 
expansion/contraction. The real exchange rate, which is a function of a 
country’s nominal exchange rate, e, multiplied by the ratio of the domestic to 
foreign price level (RER = ), indicates the relative competitiveness of a 
country vis-à-vis their trading partners (the nominal exchange rate for regions 
that share a common currency is equivalent to 1, meaning that the real 
exchange rate between members of a currency union is purely a function of 
relative prices). If a country is successful in keeping its inflation rate low 
relative to its trading partners, it realizes a competitive depreciation in the 
real exchange rate which should improve its trade balance. If a country’s 
national inflation rate exceeds that of its trading partner, the result is, all other 
Comparative Institutional Advantage in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
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things equal, an appreciation in the real exchange rate which worsens its 
trade balance. 
We assume that wage-setters within the exposed sector face strong incentives 
to pursue wage moderation (i.e. real wage growth below or at least on par 
with productivity growth) because their employment status is heavily tied to 
a competitiveness constraint: if wages in this sector are too high, this will lead 
to a reduction in employment via one of two employer mark-up strategies. If 
employers pass wages increases onto prices, their products become more 
expensive vis-à-vis their trading partners, yielding lower demand from 
international buyers and to a reduction in production. Likewise, if employers 
do not translate wage increases into rising prices, they compensate for an 
increased wage bill by shedding employment. Regardless of which strategy is 
chosen, the end result is the same – reduced employment – thus providing 
exposed sector wage-setters the incentive to limit their wage demands. Wage 
developments within the sheltered sector, in contrast, are not directly 
influenced by trade, and wage setters in this sector therefore face a 
considerably less restrictive competitiveness constraint, if they face one at all. 
Non-market services (i.e. health services, education, public administrators) in 
particular face a very different wage-setting regime than the exposed sector, 
given secure employment, and the relative absence of competition because of 
their near monopoly provision of certain services. 
Despite the fact that wage-setters within sheltered sectors do not face similar 
incentives to enforce wage moderation as those in the exposed, wage 
developments within the sheltered sector can have a significant influence on a 
country’s trade developments given its weight within national inflation: the 
aggregate national inflation rate is, in effect, the weighted average of the two 
separate inflation rates in the exposed and in the sheltered sectors. Re-writing 
a country’s real exchange rate as a composite of sectoral prices (RER = 
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, where α/β and (1-α)/(1-β) are the weights associated with the 
exposed and sheltered sector prices in the domestic and foreign inflation rate, 
respectively), sheltered sector wage growth becomes an important 
determinant of the real exchange rate via its impact on sheltered sector prices. 
The presence of a competitiveness constraint limits the mark-up power of 
employers in the exposed sector, keeping price developments relatively 
similar across countries. Hence, real exchange rate developments are crucially 
linked to a country’s capacity to limit wage inflationary pressures within the 
sheltered sector. This places wage-setters in the exposed sector in a precarious 
position vis-à-vis their counter-parts in the sheltered sector: while the former 
have high incentives to moderate wages in order to remain (price) 
competitive, the latter do not but are able to influence the employment status 
in the former if they price wages high enough to significantly influence 
national inflation.  
Because external competitiveness imposes a hard constraint on the export 
sector, the exposed sector will set wages taking into account relative wage 
inflation rates in the main trading partners (if it does not, in this analysis, it 
simply exacerbates the inflationary pressures arising from the sheltered 
sector). There are, therefore, four logically possible worlds. The first is the one 
in which inflation in the sheltered sector is kept under control through legal, 
political and institutional means. In this world, the aggregate wage inflation 
rate will not rise, and almost certainly not faster than elsewhere, and relative 
competitiveness is likely to be reasonably stable or improving. Note that in 
such a scenario, improving competitiveness can also produce fiscal effects, if 
these legal or political institutions support governments in managing the 
public sector wage bill (although as Germany and Belgium’s fiscal 
performance suggest, moderated public sector wage growth is not a sufficient 
condition for low aggregate fiscal balances). The second scenario is one in 
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which wage inflation in the sheltered sector is relatively high, but this is 
compensated by a combination of high productivity and moderate wage 
growth in the exposed sector, proportionate to the relative sizes of both 
sectors. Aggregate inflation remains modest, and the country’s export sector 
does not price itself out of export markets. The third possible world – a 
variation on the second, but with very different outcomes – combines a 
sheltered sector with inflationary wages and an exposed sector, which, hard 
as it may try, is unable to bridge the relative inflation gap. Aggregate inflation 
thus increases, the real exchange rate appreciates, and export prices rise, with 
the concomitant negative effect on competitiveness. The fourth possible 
scenario, involving inflationary wages in the exposed sector, is, in many 
ways, an extension of the third. Such inflationary wages in the exposed sector, 
irrational though they may seem, usually come about because the exposed 
sector is a trend follower, rather than, as in the second scenario, a trend setter 
in wages. This is the extremely dangerous constellation where both sectors 
contribute to wage inflation, which we have seen in some of the Southern 
European economies over the last decade. 
The dualistic nature of wage-setting incentives and wage moderation 
objectives by sector is not a novel idea and has been highlighted by many 
(Crouch, 1990; Iversen, 1999; Garrett and Way, 1999; Franzese, 2001; Johnston 
and Hancké, 2009). Many in this literature have analysed how wage 
bargaining institutions can bridge these diverging incentives by tying wage-
determination in non-tradable sectors to tradable ones (Franzese, 2001; 
Baccaro and Simoni, 2007; Traxler and Brandl, 2010; Brandl, 2012; 
Ramskogler, 2013). Among these arguments, Traxler and Brandl (2010) and 
Brandl (2012) offer perhaps the most empirically sophisticated analyses. They 
outline how bargaining regimes that constrain the public sector – the key 
‘sheltered’ sector, with strong trade unions and collective bargaining systems 
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set against a background of employment security – influence national wage 
outcomes. Collective bargaining systems that transfer significant trend-setting 
power to employers and unions in the exposed sector, they argue, are 
particularly effective at limiting wage growth in sheltered sectors. Building on 
these insightful analyses, we identify how bargaining systems influence wage 
differentials between exposed and sheltered sectors and how these wage 
differentials produce divergent competitive performances within EMU. 
Wage-setting regimes that discipline wages in the sheltered sector should 
witness a trade surplus advantage, which translates in to a current account 
surplus. This makes them net creditors, while the others witness current 
account deficits and hence have had to assume greater public and private 
borrowing in order to finance them. The common currency in EMU renders a 
country’s exchange rate purely as a function of relative inflation: countries 
that are more successful in keeping inflation under control (particularly 
within their sheltered sectors where wage moderation incentives are 
relatively weak), will witness more advantageous real exchange rates and 
more favorable current accounts. By the balance of payments identity, 
countries with more favorable current accounts become the creditors while 
countries with less favorable current accounts become the debtors. 
The vast literatures in industrial relations and political science on the topic of 
sectoral corporatism have demonstrated quite convincingly that bargaining 
regimes which are most conducive towards limiting sheltered sector wage 
growth are those which grant considerable trend-setting authority to exposed 
sector wage-setters, the state, or a combination of both. Both these actors 
favour limited sheltered (especially public) sector wage growth: the former in 
the name of competitiveness, the latter in the name of fiscal prudence. Such 
bargaining regimes that transfer considerable powers to exposed-sector actors 
and/or the state take three shapes. The first are pattern bargaining systems 
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where the exposed sector leads national wage developments (Traxler and 
Brandl, 2010). The second consists of state-coordinated systems that enforce a 
permanent wage law or permanently encourage export-sector led bargaining 
(Pochet, 2004). And the third consists of incomes policies/wage pacts with a 
high degree of ‘governability’, which grant employers and/or governments 
considerable authority in the determination of sectoral/national wage 
settlements3 -- typically this is introduced by governments after unsuccessful 
attempts to produce wage moderation, usually as a result of the weakness of 
peak associations (Brandl, 2012). In contrast, bargaining regimes that have 
been identified as limiting the role of the exposed sector and the state in 
collective bargaining are: one, peak-level bargaining systems where wages are 
determined by peak-organizations which embody multiple sectors (Traxler, 
Blaschke and Kittle, 2001); two, regimes where there is no coordinating 
mechanism between wage-setters; and, three, incomes policies or wage pacts 
with a low degree of governability (Brandl, 2012). 
Peak-level bargaining, as Traxler and Brandl (2010) point out, can be more 
conducive towards delivering sheltered sector wage restraint if the exposed 
sector is given a leading voice and governance within peak-organizations is 
high – this explains the success of the Danish case in the 2000s, with the rise of 
five major wage bargaining cartels where wage setting was anchored by the 
industrial/manufacturing cartel. Incomes policies and, more notably, wage 
pacts with high governability are not usually permanent systems of 
coordination, as these policies and pacts tend to be more reactive by nature, 
often introduced and (in some cases unilaterally) implemented by 
governments in times of crisis. Nevertheless, they are frequently used to 
correct wage inflation across the entire economy, including sheltered sectors. 
                                                        
3 Examples of this include governments determining national wages unilaterally (via legislation 
enforcing a nation-wide wage-freeze) or wage pacts that grant export-sector employers or the 
state considerable authority in agenda setting. 
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Hence, this method of coordination is very effective at producing temporary 
wage moderation in the sheltered sector (even if persistent government 
intervention in wage bargaining may not be acceptable to social partners in 
the long run). These types of systems, and where they exist among developed 
economies, are outlined in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Wage moderation by bargaining regime and country (2000-2007) 
 
Collective bargaining institutions 
that are conducive towards 
consistent sheltered sector wage 
moderation 
Collective bargaining institutions 
that are conducive towards 
temporary or permanent sheltered 
sector wage excess 
 
Pattern-bargaining systems (export-
sector led): Austria, Germany, Japan, 
Sweden 
 
State imposed wage laws/state 
coordination (export-sector led): 
Belgium, France 
 
Incomes policies/Wage Pacts with high 
governability: Finland (2000, 2002-
2006), the Netherlands (2002-2004) 
 
 
Peak-level bargaining:  
- HG: Denmark, Finland (2001 & 
2007), Netherlands (2000-
2001, 2005-2007) 
- LG: Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 
No coordination: Australia, Canada, 
United Kingdom, United States 
 
Incomes policies/wage pacts with low 
governability: Ireland 
  
Note: LG indicates low governability, HG indicates high governability  
Source: Brandl, 2012, Visser, 2011, European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(various articles)  
 
Given the distinction in the literature on how bargaining regimes influence 
sheltered sector wage developments, i.e. via power dynamics between the 
state/exposed sector and the sheltered sector, we expect EMU countries with 
bargaining regimes in the left-hand column of Table 1 (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, and between 2002 and 2004 the Netherlands) to 
exert greater levels of wage moderation compared to countries in the right-
hand column, which lists countries without permanent mechanisms to 
constrain sheltered sector wage growth (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and the 
Netherlands between 2000 and 2001 and after 2005).  Consequently, countries 
with bargaining regimes that are conducive towards wage moderation will 
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witness lower national inflation, a more competitive real exchange rate and 
hence an improvement in their export share/current account balances. 
 
Empirical Model and Variable Selection 
We employ a panel regression analysis to test how the suppression of 
sheltered sector wages influences national competitiveness. In order to avoid 
an EMU bias, we select a 17 country sample from 1980 to 2007, which includes 
ten countries that adopted the euro in 1999 (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) as well 
as seven non-EMU participants (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, 
the UK, and the US).  We selected 2007 as the end of our sample for two 
reasons: sectoral data which we use for the construction of one of our primary 
independent variables of interest only exists until 2007 for the 17 countries in 
this analysis. In addition, given the extraordinary circumstances since the 
crisis for countries with non-competitive bargaining systems and the 
regulation of wages in the sheltered sector, we sought to remove this 
exceptional period after 2007. We select export share growth4 as a proxy for 
national competitiveness, rather than current account dynamics, in order to 
concentrate our analysis on how sheltered sector wage suppression influences 
the capacity of the export sector to expand output. Countries with a 
competitive real exchange rate should witness greater export expansion than 
those with an uncompetitive real exchange rate. 
We select two independent variables as proxies for institutions that support 
wage moderation in the sheltered sector: the (lagged) differential between 
sheltered and manufacturing sector wage growth (results presented in Tables 
                                                        
4 We do not select export share levels as the dependent variable, given the absence of time 
stationarity within panels. 
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3 and 4), and a crude institutional dummy which embodies the value of 1 if a 
country at time t possesses one of the three bargaining institutions that 
enforce sheltered sector wage moderation, i.e. pattern bargaining, state-
imposed coordination or incomes-policies/wage-pacts with high governability 
(results presented in Table 5). Since the first of these specifically measures the 
degree to which a country has managed to suppress wages in the sheltered 
sector below those in the trade-exposed manufacturing sector, it is a superior 
indicator. Since this indicator can be driven by both export sector wage 
moderation or sheltered sector wage excess, we also conduct supplementary 
regressions (Table 6), examining the influence of real wage growth in these 
sectors in isolation of each other on export share growth. Sheltered sector 
wage suppression is defined as the difference in the growth rate of the hourly 
wage in the sheltered sector and the growth rate of the hourly wage in the 
exposed sector.5 Using the difference in sheltered and exposed sector wages 
rather than absolute sheltered sector wage growth removes direct influence of 
exposed sector wage dynamics on those in the sheltered sector. Hence what is 
captured is the degree to which sheltered sector wage setters have 
over/undershot wage developments within the (exposed) manufacturing 
sector, with positive/negative developments indicating that sheltered sector 
wage setters have managed to secure more/less lucrative wage gains than 
their exposed sector counter-parts. 
We selected an employment-share weighted composite of the public 
administration and defence, education, and health and social work sectors - 
ISIC categories L, M and N, respectively – given these sectors relatively 
sheltered status from both foreign (and domestic) competition. For the 
exposed sector, we selected manufacturing (ISIC category D) as a proxy. 
                                                        
5 Because we are selecting the difference in sectoral wage growth within countries, real versus 
nominal wage distinctions become irrelevant, since both sectors are exposed to the same 
national inflation rate). We incorporate real wage growth for the supplementary regressions, 
where absolute wage growth is the primary independent variable of interest, in Table 6. 
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Wage and employment data are taken from the EU KLEMS database. Table 2 
presents average wage growth differentials between our sheltered sector 
proxy and exposed sector proxy by bargaining regime between 1980 and 
2007. The most persistent suppression of annual wage growth in the sheltered 
sector relative to the manufacturing sector is found in bargaining regimes that 
are characterized by pattern bargaining, state-imposed wage laws/export-
sector coordination, and incomes policies/wage pacts with high governability. 
State-imposed coordination was the most effective at delivering sheltered 
sector wage suppression: wage growth in the sheltered sector was, on 
average, 1.14% below that in manufacturing each year between 1980 and 2007, 
implying the emergence of a 11.4% wage gap in favor of the manufacturing 
sector over a ten-year period). Weakly coordinated bargaining regimes also 
suppressed sheltered sector wage growth on average, albeit to a lesser extent 
than institutional frameworks built on coordination in the left hand column of 
Table 2. Peak-level bargaining regimes with high governability appear to 
have a similar capacity to sheltered sector wage suppression as high 
governability incomes-policies/wage pact regimes – likely the result of 
successful vertical coordination that can be feasibly implemented by powerful 
peak-associations.  
Peak-level coordination with low governability and incomes policies/pacts 
with low governability proved the least effective at delivering sheltered sector 
wage suppression (for the former, wage growth in the sheltered sector was, 
on average, 0.32% above that in manufacturing each year between 1980 and 
2007, implying the emergence of a 3.2% wage gap in favor of the sheltered 
sector over a 10 year period). The influence of an uncoordinated wage 
bargaining regime on wage growth differentials is more difficult to predict. 
Under Baumol’s cost-disease framework (Baumol and Bowen, 1965) if wage-
setters in an uncoordinated regime individually agree on wage settlements 
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that are equivalent to inflation (or average wage increases), differences in 
sectoral wage growth should be nil. If, however, wages are set according to a 
neo-classical framework, where workers receive pay awards based upon their 
productivity, these regimes may produce negative pay differentials between 
sheltered sectors and manufacturing, as the former tends to be dominated by 
service sectors where productivity growth is lower than in goods-based 
production sectors. While countries with no coordination bargaining regimes 
within our sample witnessed negative wage growth differentials between the 
sheltered and manufacturing sector (0.29% annual wage gaps on average), 
these differentials were substantially less than the pattern bargaining, state-
imposed and high governability incomes policies bargaining regimes.   
Table 2: Differences in sheltered sector and manufacturing sector annual 
wage growth by bargaining regime, 1980-2007 average 
 
Collective bargaining institutions 
that are conducive towards 
consistent sheltered sector wage 
moderation 
Collective bargaining institutions 
that are conducive towards 
temporary or permanent sheltered 
sector wage excess 
 
Pattern-bargaining systems (export-
sector led): -0.66% annual difference 
 
State imposed wage laws/state 
coordination (export-sector led): -
1.14% annual difference 
 
Incomes policies/Wage Pacts with high 
governability: -0.41% annual difference 
 
 
Peak-level bargaining:  
- HG: -0.40 annual difference 
- LG: 0.32% annual difference 
 
No coordination: -0.29% annual 
difference 
 
Incomes policies/wage pacts with low 
governability: 0.24% annual difference 
  
Note: HG and LG refer to high and low governability 
 
In order to examine our hypothesis that different wage-governance structures 
yielded significantly different export share growth rates, we used a crude 
sectoral wage-governance dummy as a means of distinguishing between 
institutions that are and are not conducive towards producing sheltered 
sector wage suppression. This dummy took the value of 1 for countries which 
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possess bargaining institutions that are conducive towards limiting sheltered 
sector wage settlements (pattern bargaining, state imposed coordination, and 
incomes policies/wage pacts with high governability), and 0 if otherwise. Six 
countries within our 17 country sample (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
UK, and the US) maintained the same bargaining institutions over the 1980-
2007 period. For this reason, we conducted these regressions without country 
fixed effects, in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity problems within these 
six panels. Data on bargaining regimes from 1980 to 2003 was taken from 
Brand (2012), while we updated data from 2004-2007 using wage pacts data 
from Visser (2011) and various articles from the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory. 
In order to test whether the relationship between sheltered sector wage 
suppression and export performance is spurious or possibly causal, we 
employ a fixed effects panel regression model of the 17 countries above from 
1980 to 2007 (as mentioned above, for the sectoral wage-governance dummy 
regressions, we employ a random effects model). The selection of growth 
rates, rather than levels delivers an added benefit for fixed effects. Using a 
growth rate for our main dependent and most of our independent variables 
makes the use of country fixed effects less problematic, as these dummies 
crowd out country-specific effects which are common in levels (see Plümper 
et al. 2005). Our results in Tables 3 and 4 remain significant and robust when 
we select random effects as an estimator, suggesting that they do not merely 
capture within-country, time variations, but also (in the random effects 
models, which are not shown here) cross-national variation.  
Our empirical model can be summarized as follows: 
Δ(X/GDP,i,t) = αi,t + β1(SheltWageSupi,t-1) + Σ βkXk,i,t + Σ βmZm,i,t + εi,t 
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in which Δ(X/GDP,i,t) is the year-on-year change in country i’s export share at 
time t, SheltWageSupi,t is the degree of sheltered wage suppression – 
measured either as the difference in log changes in the sheltered sector and 
manufacturing hourly wage for country i at time t-1 (results presented in 
Tables 3 and 4), as the crude high sectoral wage-governance dummy (results 
presented in Table 5), or as the absolute sheltered/manufacturing wage 
growth measure in isolation of manufacturing/sheltered sector wage growth 
(Table 6) – ΣXk,i,t is a vector of economic controls and ΣZm,i,t is a vector of 
institutional controls. Data for export shares were taken from the EU’s 
AMECO database. First differences are used for the dependent variable as 
well as most independent variables given the violation of time-stationarity 
within panels. For the sectoral wage independent variables, the (lagged) 
difference is used to avoid endogeneity problems with the dependent 
variable, as well as multicollinearity problems with terms of trade shocks and 
changes in the real exchange rate which we incorporate as controls (see 
below).  
Regarding economic controls, we include year-on-year changes in net 
government borrowing, in order to test whether fiscal developments play a 
significant role in export expansion (Table 3, columns III-VI), terms of trade 
shocks and real exchange rate shocks; though our theory of how sectoral 
wage dynamics influences export performance operates primarily via the real 
exchange rate, we include it as a separate control to account for real exchange 
rate movements that may be influenced by developments other than sectoral 
wage dynamics (such as the prices of non-labour, factor inputs). We excluded 
terms of trades shocks from the wage-governance dummy regressions, given 
their slight, but significant, correlation with the dummy variable across all 
panels. Real interest rate shocks were purposefully excluded given their 
relationship by identity with real exchange rate shocks, via the interest rate 
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parity condition.6 Terms of trade, net government borrowing and real 
exchange rate data all stem from the EU’s AMECO database. For institutional 
controls, we included the level (not change) of social benefits as a percentage 
of GDP to account for Rodrik’s (1998) hypothesis that highly open countries 
have large welfare states as an insurance mechanism against market risk; the 
proportion of legislative seats held by right parties to account for the fact that 
these parties may be more likely to pursue pro-business policies which favor 
export-growth; wage bargaining centralization; and the employment share of 
the sheltered sector (employment in sectors ISIC categories L, M and N as a 
percentage of total employment) to account for Garrett and Way’s (1999) 
hypothesis that larger sheltered (public) sectors produce greater wage 
inflation and hence hamper macroeconomic outcomes. Because these data are 
presented in levels, their significance is likely to be influenced by the use of a 
fixed effects estimator, which we consider below. Wage centralization data 
stem from Visser (2011), right-wing legislative seats stem from Swank (2006), 
social benefits as a percentage of GDP were constructed from EU AMECO 
data, and sectoral employment share data stem from EU KLEMS.7 Given the 
presence of auto-correlation for the baseline regressions, we incorporated a 
panel-specific Prais-Winsten transformation into our models, which both 
corrects for auto-correlation and absorbs less time-series dynamics than a 
lagged dependent variable (Plümper et al, 2005).8 Panel corrected standard 
errors are used to control for heteroskedascity within panels (Beck and Katz, 
                                                        
6 Given that all countries within the sample are developed and possess limited capital controls, it 
is fair to assume that this condition would hold. 
7 The data appendix outlines the sources of all variables and how they were constructed. 
8 The LR Chi-squared statistics for the Wooldridge test for panel autocorrelation for the sectoral 
wage differential and governance dummy baseline models were 29.9 (p-value=0.000) and 19.57 
(p-value=0.000), respectively. For the baseline models where real public sector wage growth and 
real manufacturing wage growth served as the primary independent variables of interest, LR Chi-
squared statistic was 30.1 (p-value=0.000) and 29.89 (p-value=0.000), respectively.  
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1995).9 We also incorporate n-1 time dummies into our regressions in order to 
control for unobserved time effects. 
In the first series of regressions, we test the preliminary relationship between 
the (lagged) difference in sheltered and manufacturing wages and growth in 
the export share with several important controls (terms of trade shocks and 
changes in the real exchange rate, both of which are not included in the same 
models together due to multicollinearity problems). Models I-III in Table 3 
present the results using the (lagged) difference in public and manufacturing 
wages as the primary independent variable of interest, while Models IV-VI 
present results where the (lagged) change in net government borrowing is the 
independent variable of interest. 
Table 3: The influence of sectoral wage differentials on export growth 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI 
(Lagged) Difference in Sheltered 
and Manu. Wage Growth 
-.18*** -.18*** -.20***    
(.067) (.066) (.066)    
(Lagged) Difference in Net 
Government Borrowing 
   0 0 0 
   (.000) (.000) (.000) 
TOT Shocks  -.47***   -.39***  
  (.074)   (.065)  
RER Shocks   -.26***   -.27*** 
   (.038)   (.030) 
Constant 2.839* .132 -.086 6.45*** .538 .955 
 (1.598) (1.469) (1.211) (1.574) (1.427) (1.158) 
Observations 474 473 474 433 433 433 
Wald Chi-Squared Statistic (P-
value) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
R-squared .302 .363 .379 .312 .354 .401 
Notes: Dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the export share 
(X/GDP). Model used was an OLS, including a panel-specific Prais-Winsten AR1 
term, from 1980 to 2007. N-1 country and time dummies included but not 
shown. Panel corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. 
 
                                                        
9 Tests for panel heteroskedasticity were run without time dummies given the failure for the 
generalized least squares iterations to achieve convergence. LR tests for the baseline models 
(column I in Tables 3 and 5) were highly significant (122.27, p-value=0.000 and 133.75, p-
value=0.000, respectively) indicating a high likelihood of panel heteroskedasticity. Tests for the 
sector wage growth models (columns I and III in Table 6) also presented significant evidence of 
heteroskedasticity (112.52, p-value=0 and 120.28, p-value=0.000, respectively). 
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Some interesting results emerge from Table 3. First, the (lagged) differentials 
between sheltered and manufacturing wages produces a significant 
dampening effect on export share growth, even when accounting for terms of 
trade and real exchange rate shocks. This implies that countries where 
sheltered sector wage growth exceeds wage growth in the manufacturing 
sector will, ceteris paribus, witness shrinkages in their export shares, while 
countries where public sector wage growth is kept below manufacturing 
wage growth witness expansions in their export shares. The second 
interesting result that emerges in Table 3 is that changes in net government 
borrowing do not have a significant or pronounced influence in terms of beta 
coefficient magnitude on export share growth. In other words, countries 
which increase fiscal deficits year-on-year do not behave significantly 
differently in terms of export performance than countries which increase 
fiscal surpluses. 
Results in Table 4 demonstrate the robustness of the difference in sheltered 
sector and manufacturing hourly growth wage variable while incorporating 
further institutional controls into the baseline model; in all models, the 
sectoral wage differential variable maintained consistency in terms of beta 
magnitude and significance. These variables also retain their significance 
when a random effects estimator is used (results not shown). Other variables 
perform as expected (TOT shocks and RER shocks are associated with export 
share contraction while social benefits as a percentage of GDP are associated 
with export share expansion, per Rodrik’s hypothesis10) or fail to hold 
significance across multiple models (bargaining centralization, and 
partisanship when RER shocks are included as a control). Partisanship and 
centralization exhibit a significant positive relationship with export growth 
when a random effects estimator is used for Model V in Table 4, although this 
                                                        
10 All of these variables retain significance when random effects are used, although social benefits 
as a percentage of GDP realizes significant reduction in its beta’s magnitude.  
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significance is not robust when terms of trade shocks are used as a control. 
Contrary to Garrett and Way’s results, sheltered sector employment share 
exhibits an insignificant relationship with export share growth, indicating that 
it is not the size of the public sector that matters per se, but whether its wage 
demands can be controlled by the exposed sector. 
Table 4: Robustness results, the influence of sectoral wage differentials on 
export growth 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI 
(Lagged) Difference in 
Sheltered and Manu. Wage 
Growth 
-0.130** -0.184*** -0.175*** -0.125** -0.22*** -0.20*** 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.067) (0.055) (0.057) (0.067) 
TOT Shocks -0.35*** -0.502*** -0.467***    
 (0.066) (0.078) (0.076)    
RER Shocks    -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.26*** 
    (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) 
Social Benefits (% of GDP) 0.61***   0.638***   
 (0.125)   (0.118)   
Legislative Seats Held  -0.036**   -0.021  
by Right Parties  (0.016)   (0.016)  
Wage Centralization  -3.749   1.043  
  (5.152)   (4.740)  
Sheltered Sector 
Employment Share 
  0.044   0.008 
   (0.043)   (0.045) 
Constant -4.01** 2.003 -1.106 -5.71*** 0.637 -0.314 
 (1.589) (1.818) (1.956) (1.566) (1.687) (1.821) 
Observations 412 435 470 412 436 471 
Wald Chi-Squared Statistic 
(P-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.381 0.404 0.365 0.429 0.383 0.379 
Notes: Dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the export share 
(X/GDP). Model used was an OLS, including a panel-specific Prais-Winsten AR1 
term, from 1980 to 2007. N-1 country and time dummies included but not 
shown. Panel corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. 
 
Regression results for the high sectoral wage-governance dummy are 
presented in Table 5. We included social benefits as a percentage of GDP in 
the baseline models but removed this indicator from models II and III given 
its high collinearity with partisanship and centralization, as well as its (minor) 
collinearity with the sheltered sector employment share. As mentioned above, 
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we exclude the terms-of-trade shock variable due to slight, but significant, 
collinearity between it and the governance dummy, as well as country fixed 
effects given perfect collinearity between them and the governance dummy 
within six panels. We conduct similar robustness checks as above, but 
contrary to the (lagged) sectoral wage differential variable, which lacked a 
significant interaction term with an EMU dummy, we also incorporate an 
interaction term between the wage-governance dummy and an EMU dummy 
to test whether the competitiveness enhancing effects of high sectoral wage-
governance were magnified under monetary union. 
Table 5: The influence of high sectoral wage-governance on export growth 
Independent Variables I II III IV 
High Sectoral Wage- 1.168** 1.082** 1.326** 0.824* 
Governance Institutions (1=yes) (0.453) (0.504) (0.531) (0.489) 
RER Shocks -0.211*** -0.197*** -0.213*** -0.209*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.031) 
Social Benefits (% of GDP) 0.202***   0.195*** 
 (0.074)   (0.074) 
Legislative Seats Held  0.012   
by Right Parties  (0.008)   
Wage Centralization  1.624   
  (1.086)   
Sheltered Sector Employment   0.024  
Share   (0.032)  
EMU Dummy    -1.759* 
    (1.046) 
EMU Dummy * High Sectoral    1.611* 
Wage-Governance Institutions    (0.853) 
Constant -3.362*** -1.912** -1.413 -3.092** 
 (1.210) (0.750) (0.935) (1.215) 
Observations 414 437 471 414 
Wald Chi-Squared Statistic (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.363 0.337 0.332 0.37 
Notes: Dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the export share 
(X/GDP). Model used was an OLS, including a panel-specific Prais-Winsten AR1 
term, from 1980 to 2007. N-1 time dummies included but not shown. Panel 
corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. 
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The high sectoral wage-governance dummy, like sectoral wage differentials, 
displays consistency in terms of significance and sign across all models in 
Table 5. Given results from columns I-III, countries that possess one of the 
collective bargaining institutions where either export sector wage setters or 
the state constrains the wage outcomes of sheltered sector employees tend to 
exhibit an annual increase in their export shares that is 1-1.3% higher than 
countries that lack these institutions. In addition to the direct effect, the wage-
governance dummy also suggests an interesting, significant interaction with 
the EMU dummy (model IV, Table 5), implying that monetary union seems to 
have magnified the influence of high wage-governance institutions on export 
growth. Countries which possess these institutions under monetary union 
witness an additional export growth advantage of 2.435% per year, compared 
with countries without high wage-governance institutions, while outside 
monetary union, this export growth advantage is reduced to a 0.824% 
expansion per year. Supporting our theoretical argument above, results from 
model IV in Table 5 indicate that countries which possessed institutions that 
suppressed sheltered sector wage growth witnessed an enhanced corporatist 
comparative advantage under their pre-crisis EMU tenure. 
Finally, because our wage growth differential variable is composed of two 
variables which may influence export performance on their own (the positive 
differential between sheltered sector and manufacturing sector wage growth 
could be driven by wage excess in the former or wage restraint in the latter) 
we also test how real sheltered and manufacturing sector wage growth 
correlates with changes in export performance.  Results from Table 6 show 
that real wage growth in both sectors are significantly correlated with export 
decline. While it is not unsurprising that manufacturing wage growth is 
significantly associated with export decline, as manufacturing sector wages 
are an important input for the export sector, the significant, negative 
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association between sheltered sector wage growth and export growth 
(Columns I-III below) suggests that wage setting activity in the sheltered 
sector creates negative externalities for the export sector – indeed, given the 
similar beta magnitudes between the models, increasing wage growth in 
either sector by an additional 1% yields similar decreases in the export share. 
Suppressing wage growth in the sheltered sector, not only in relative but also 
in absolute terms, is an important condition for export success.   
Table 6: The influence of sectoral wage growth on export growth 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI 
(Lagged) Real Sheltered 
Sector wage growth 
-0.34*** -0.33*** -0.32***    
(0.058) (0.053) (0.048)    
(Lagged) Real Manufacturing    -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.27*** 
sector wage growth    (0.067) (0.064) (0.065) 
TOT Shocks -0.36***   -0.37***   
 (0.069)   (0.067)   
REER Shocks  -0.26*** -0.23***  -0.27*** -0.22*** 
  (0.032) (0.028)  (0.033) (0.030) 
Social Benefits (% of GDP) 0.55*** 0.59*** 0.69*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.74*** 
 (0.126) (0.120) (0.105) (0.121) (0.117) (0.115) 
Legislative Seats Held   -0.033**   -0.032** 
by Right Parties   (0.015)   (0.014) 
Wage Centralization   3.411   3.88 
   (4.763)   (5.128) 
Constant -3.32** -5.12*** -5.38*** -3.75** -5.53*** -6.23*** 
 (1.550) (1.486) (1.885) (1.490) (1.440) (2.011) 
Observations 412 412 378 412 412 378 
Wald Chi-Squared Statistic 
(P-value) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.42 0.463 0.479 0.398 0.44 0.446 
Notes: Dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the export share 
(X/GDP). Model used was an OLS, including a panel-specific Prais-Winsten AR1 
term, from 1980 to 2007. N-1 country and time dummies included but not 
shown. Panel corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alison Johnston, Bob Hancké & Suman Pant 
37   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of the regression analysis are straightforward. Countries in which 
inflationary wage developments in the (private and public) sheltered sector 
are compensated by disinflationary wages in the exposed sector report export 
gains and current account surplus gains as a result of their relatively low 
inflation rates. If the exposed sector is unable to compensate for inflationary 
wages elsewhere in the economy, the reverse happens: competitiveness falls 
and exports decline. The effects are the combination of current account 
surpluses and capital account deficits for the creditor nations (primarily in the 
north of Europe) and current account deficits accompanied by borrowing (in 
both the public and the private sector) in the others.  
Importantly, this effect appears to operate primarily though a (wage) price 
level effect, with domestic inflation eroding export competitiveness, thus 
leading to current account deficits, and not a fiscal effect, in which expanding 
budgets produce excessive public (and private) borrowing. Equally 
importantly, while the effect existed before the introduction of the euro, the 
fixed exchange rate regime heralded by EMU has reinforced this dynamic 
because of the absence of a safety valve in the form of nominal exchange rate 
depreciations. The crisis of EMU since 2008 may therefore primarily be a 
result of differences in wage-setting systems between north-western Europe 
and southern Europe, in which the former have been able to keep aggregate 
inflation under control through wage coordination (and concurrent supply-
side productivity improvements), while the latter appear unable to do so. It is 
emphatically not a crisis of fiscal profligacy: budget balances show up as 
insignificant factors in our analysis. They are, if anything, symptoms of the 
problem, not causes.  
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Wages thus have been crucial in terms of inter-country adjustment in the 
European political economy since at least the introduction of the Maastricht 
criteria, if not before. Prima facie, this seems to confirm a central element in 
the standard interpretation of monetary unions and its challenges – the theory 
of optimal currency areas (OCA). According to that view, fixing exchange 
rates, interest rates, and fiscal policy inevitably implies that the bulk of 
adjustment runs through labour market flexibility. A closer look at the results 
here suggests that the world is not only more complex than these arguments 
suggest, but that this view covers, at best, only one possible world. The 
economies that have performed well under EMU have been those that relied 
on wage moderation – but essentially of the type provided by a combination 
of strong labour unions, wage coordination, and skills-based export 
competitiveness – almost the exact institutional opposite of the flexible labour 
markets proposed by OCA protagonists.  
Wage moderation, however, is not an unmitigated blessing, as the inter-
country dynamics of wage setting in EMU make clear. All other things equal, 
competitiveness gains in one group of countries as a result of real exchange 
rate depreciations must imply competitiveness losses as a result of real 
exchange rate appreciations elsewhere. In effect, by targeting unit labour cost 
growth below that of their trading partners, and using relatively tight systems 
of wage coordination as a means to do so, the creditor countries have 
imposed current account deficits on the others who lacked the institutional 
capacity to moderate wages. This does not bode well for the future of the 
single currency. For even if the current crisis can be contained, for example 
through a dramatic fiscal restructuring of the euro-zone, that would only buy 
time. The structural dynamics associated with the current account 
divergences that led to the crisis, which themselves have deep roots in the 
Alison Johnston, Bob Hancké & Suman Pant 
39   
 
different types of wage setting, will reassert themselves if they continue to 
remain unaddressed.  
This has important implications for the policies currently (in 2012 and 13) 
adopted by the EU, especially in its Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP). The MIP is asymmetric, in the sense that the language regarding 
current account imbalances focuses solely on deficits, with little or no 
consideration that in a currency union which is (mostly) a closed economy, 
significant current account surpluses in one country imply significant current 
account deficits elsewhere. While some adjustment might be welcome, it is 
hard to see how ‘internal devaluations’, implying massive relative wage 
moderation in the deficit countries, can solve the problem on their own – 
assuming that beggar-thy-neighbour policies ever can. Without a parallel 
reflation or demand expansion in the creditor countries, particularly in 
Germany and among its well-performing neighbours, the problem is almost 
intractable. Put differently, alongside arguments for structural adjustment in 
the south, the European Commission should also consider using its influence 
to argue for significant wage increases in Germany for several years to come 
in order to allow southern Europe the space to adjust.  
That, of course, is wishful thinking, if the arguments that have been coming 
from Berlin since the onset of the euro-crisis are anything to go by. Whilst 
there has been some muted mention of higher wages, the general tenor of 
German policy (and in its wake, in its satellites in northern Europe as well) 
has been in favour of more not less austerity, without aiming at expansion, 
wage-led or otherwise. In addition, it is not entirely clear what actually would 
happen if Germany adopted an expansionary course: the ECB’s relatively 
dovish stance might – and according to its mandate almost certainly will – 
change, since rising German inflation is very likely to entail higher aggregate 
inflation throughout EMU. A reaction by the ECB thus would all but 
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eliminate the gains made through ‘symmetric adjustment’, but with an 
additional price for Germany to pay in the guise of higher interest rates. 
Germany’s reluctance to engage in expansive policies might be informed by a 
misguided understanding of its own interests, as many observers have 
pointed out, but it is also built on a hard political-economic understanding of 
monetary policy in Europe that leaves policy-makers and wage setters in the 
country little choice.  
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Data Appendix: Variable Measurement and Sources 
Variable Measurement Source 
Export share growth Log change in the export 
share (measured as exports 
divided by GDP) 
European Commission’s 
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database.  
Differences in sectoral 
hourly wage growth 
The difference in the 
following values: 1) the log 
change of the sum of 
compensation of employees 
within the public 
administration and defence 
(ISIC category L), education 
(ISIC category M), and 
health and social work 
(ISIC category N) sectors 
divided by the sum of total 
hours worked within these 
sectors, and; 2) the log 
change of the sum of 
compensation of employees 
within manufacturing (ISIC 
category D), divided by the 
sum of total hours worked 
within manufacturing.  
EU KLEMS Database 
Sectoral hourly wage 
growth 
The sectoral hourly wage 
growth variables are the 
absolute values of those 
used in the differenced 
variable, adjusted for 
annual inflation. 
EU KLEMS Database and 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (for inflation 
data) 
Net public borrowing Net public borrowing 
divided by GDP 
European Commission’s 
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database. Sweden and 
Australia’s more complete 
deficit data was obtained 
from the OECD.  
Terms of Trade Shocks The change in terms of 
trade (from the previous 
year) 
European Commission’s 
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database.  
Real Exchange Rate Shocks The change in the real 
exchange rate (from the 
previous year) 
European Commission’s 
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database.  
Social Benefits Social benefits other than 
social transfers in kind as a 
percentage of GDP 
European Commission’s 
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database.  
Partisanship Right-party legislative seats 
as a percentage of total 
legislative seats. In election 
years, party seats are 
weighted according to 
tenure. 
Swank’s (2006) 
Comparative Parties 
Dataset 
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Centralization Based on Iversen’s (1999) 
centralization index. 
Ranges from 0 (no 
centralization among 
unions) to 1 (monopoly 
centralization among 
unions). 
Visser (2009)  
Sheltered Sector 
Employment Share 
The number of employees 
within the public 
administration and defence 
(ISIC category L), education 
(ISIC category M), and 
health and social work 
(ISIC category N) as a 
proportion of the total 
labor force 
EU KLEMS Database 
EMU Dummy Assumes the value of 1 for 
years 1999-2007 for the 
following countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. 0 if 
otherwise. 
NA 
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